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 ●  There are frequent calls for financial markets to be more actively 
regulated. In nearly all cases it is assumed that regulation must come 
from state agencies such as the Financial Conduct Authority or the 
Prudential Regulation Authority.
 ●  This analysis arises from neo-classical, market-failure approaches to 
economics which suggest that the market does not maximise welfare 
if certain (unachievable) conditions do not hold and that action by 
government is then necessary to move the market towards the welfare-
maximising position.
 ●  Just as the assumptions do not hold for welfare maximisation in an 
entirely unregulated market, we cannot know whether government 
regulatory action will move us away from or towards the welfare-
maximising position unless we also make unrealistic assumptions about 
behaviour in regulatory agencies, amongst politicians and amongst 
the electorate as a whole. The neo-classical, market-failure approach 
therefore takes us down an intellectual rabbit hole.
 ●  There is a long history of regulation being provided within markets. 
Indeed, so-called big bang and deregulation involved the prohibition 
by government of private regulators of securities markets (the 
London Stock Exchange) on the ground that regulation was anti-
competitive. Independent professions, such as the accountancy 
profession, also developed in the nineteenth century as a 
result of market demand. They regulated behaviour, but without 




 ●  It is possible to think of regulation as being part of the set of services 
that can be provided by the market rather than something that has to be 
done to the market ex-post. The discovery of regulatory organisations is 
part of the entrepreneurial market process. This does not only happen 
in areas such as finance. There is a long history of private regulatory 
bodies in a range of areas within the economy – perhaps most notably 
in sport, but more recently in areas such as taxi provision.
 ●  Regulatory institutions evolving within the market are not simply 
nineteenth century (or earlier) historical curiosities. They continue 
to evolve, despite the attempts by government agencies to regulate 
markets in very detailed ways. Modern examples would include the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) whose record 
during the financial crisis was faultless.
 ●  There are disadvantages arising from private regulatory bodies 
and also situations where they may work less well. For example, 
they can encourage cartelistic behaviour. In addition, they may not 
be as effective where the economic activity that is being regulated 
gives rise to widespread social costs beyond market participants. 
Furthermore, private regulatory bodies may lack the means of enforcing 
their regulations. In relation to the first point, it should be noted that 
government regulators are monopolistic by design and it is normally 
illegal for people to practise in the relevant market unless they are 
approved by the regulator. In relation to the third point, restrictions on 
means of enforcement are generally imposed by government in the 
first place.
 ●  We should reject market failure analysis and operate under the 
assumption that the market can provide regulatory services because 
they are valued by market participants. Where statutory regulation is 
used, it should generally be voluntary with products not regulated by 
the statutory regulator being clearly identified as such. Furthermore, 
the Competition and Markets Authority should conduct regular 
investigations into whether regulatory services provided by the state 
inhibit competition. To take one topical example, outside financial 
markets, Transport for London should not be able to establish a 
regulatory monopoly by being allowed to regulate or, still less, being 
allowed to prohibit Uber. TfL and Uber should be seen as alternative, 
competing regulatory bodies for ride services
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In economic analysis, the case for regulation is normally situated within 
a ‘market failure’ framework. According to this approach, if some of the 
conditions that are regarded as necessary for markets to maximise welfare 
do not hold, regulatory interventions can increase welfare.
The specific justifications for regulating financial markets within this 
framework were discussed by Llewellyn (1999) in the first Occasional 
Paper published by the Financial Services Authority (FSA). These 
justifications included information asymmetries between buyers and sellers; 
the importance of market confidence which has externality effects; consumer 
demand for regulation to lower transactions costs; and the need to address 
externalities caused by the systemic effects of the failure of a particular 
financial firm. 
Those who make the case for statutory regulation pose a false dichotomy. 
The alternative to markets that are not regulated by the state is not the 
absence of regulation, but regulation by non-state bodies. And the relevant 
comparison to make is between the efficacy of state regulation and that 
of regulation by other bodies. 
Indeed, regulation can be thought of as part of the set of services that 
markets can deliver and regulatory institutions can be regarded as the 
product of the market process, competition and entrepreneurship. 
Regulation is not something that should be done to the market after the 
fact by a supposedly disinterested body. This way of thinking is the 
appropriate interpretation of a wide range of work from researchers such 
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as Stringham (2015) and is in the tradition of work by Peter Boettke and 
Elinor Ostrom.1
The sections that follow examine the growth of state regulation and historical 
and modern examples of private alternatives. The paper then provides a 
conceptual framework within which we can better understand the efficacy 
and appropriateness of statutory regulatory interventions. This framework 
is superior to the ‘market failure’ framework of neo-classical economics.
1  Though, rather than suggesting that regulation in financial markets should be part 
of some kind of polycentric system, as Ostrom studied in the case of common-pool 
resources, I will argue that, in large part regulation of the financial sector can be 
undertaken entirely by private bodies.
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Government financial  
regulation in the UK
The advent of statutory regulation of financial markets
It is unusual to question the role of and supposed need for government 
financial regulation in modern economies. However, until recently, there 
was very little regulation of financial markets by the state in the UK. Until 
1988, the sale of financial products was regulated by consumer protection 
law and by general contract law. Before the so-called ‘Big Bang’ in 1986, 
securities markets were generally regulated by private stock exchanges 
except for occasional primary legislation and Companies Acts which imposed 
very specific and limited requirements on those trading in securities as well 
as on publicly listed companies. The extension of statutory regulation to 
the mortgage market is more recent still. The sale of mortgages continued 
to be regulated only by consumer protection law until 2004. The same was 
true of general insurance until 2005. Furthermore, until recent times, the 
UK insurance industry was regulated by a regime known as ‘freedom with 
publicity’ – essentially the approach was: ‘do what you like as long as you 
say you are doing it’. It is difficult to date precisely the demise of this system 
for regulating insurance markets, but it remained largely intact until the 
early 1980s at least.2 Pension funds were also largely unregulated by the 
state until the Pensions Act 1995. This Act was passed as a reaction to 
fraud and theft in one particular scheme,3 something which, of course, has 
always been illegal and the policing of which is the purpose of primary law. 
The Financial Services Act 1986, which came into force in 1988, and also 
the ‘Big Bang’ in October 1986, were revolutionary acts in the development 
of financial regulation in the UK. The Big Bang effectively clipped the wings 
2 See Booth (2007). 




of private regulatory institutions that had existed up to that point for around 
300 years. The Financial Services Act then instituted a system of regulation 
of financial markets that was ultimately accountable to the state and which 
was all-encompassing within the sectors to which it applied. 
No person operating in financial or investment markets outside real estate 
could escape the remit of the regulatory bodies created after the Financial 
Services Act. Chapter II of the Act stated: ‘no person shall carry on, or 
purport to carry on, investment business in the United Kingdom unless 
he is an authorised person under Chapter III or an exempted person under 
Chapter IV’.4 The following clause in the Act set out a maximum two-year 
prison sentence for those contravening the requirement for authorisation. 
This essentially was the advent of total state control over who could conduct 
investment business and how it could be conducted. Under the Act, even 
hitherto independent professions had to be authorised so that their members 
could carry on limited business under the supervision of their professional 
bodies. The various regulatory bodies, which ultimately reported to the 
Securities and Investment Board, which was in turn accountable to the 
Treasury, controlled all aspects of financial regulation covering securities 
markets dealing, investment products, investment management, life 
insurance and pensions products, and the provision of investment advice. 
Occupational pension funds, the prudential regulation of insurance 
companies and banks, the provision of credit and bank loans (including 
mortgages) and non-life insurance were excluded from this regulatory 
system in 1986. However, all have since been included in the statutory 
regulatory regime under one guise or another. 
4 See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/60/pdfs/ukpga_19860060_en.pdf 
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The continuing development of government regulation
Since 1986, the system of state regulation has evolved further. From the 
complex series of self-regulatory bodies ultimately accountable to the 
Treasury, the single regulator, the Financial Services Authority was 
established in an arrangement formalised in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000. Following the financial crisis and the election of the 
coalition government in 2010, the Financial Services Authority had its 
responsibilities split between the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in 2013. The former organisation 
is part of the Bank of England.
The approach of government financial regulators is sometimes described 
as ‘principles based’.5 However, it is difficult to argue that such a description 
applies today. Insofar as it has ever applied, so-called ‘principles-based’ 
regulation created policy uncertainty by allowing for the retrospective 
interpretation of rules that were unclear or not obviously intended to prohibit 
activities that subsequently came under the microscope. There is certainly 
no shortage of detail when it comes to financial regulation. And the principles 
of caveat emptor and freedom of contract are not obviously present. In 
2011, the UK financial regulator brought in regulation or issued guidance, 
advice, discussion documents or consultations, totalling 4.3 million words 
– more than five times the length of the Bible. This included a 585-page 
consultation on the regulation of the mortgage market, which led to a 
312-page document on regulations relating to the sale of mortgages. Not 
only were defaults on UK mortgages not implicated in the financial crash, 
mortgage defaults have never been responsible for a serious bank failure 
in the UK. As noted above, the statutory regulation of mortgages is a very 
recent development in the UK.
Today, the FCA has the ability to determine its own burden of proof, levy 
fines, and prevent people from working in any area of financial markets. 
It has wide-ranging enforcement powers equivalent to those adjudicated 
in civil and criminal courts with none of the accountability or guarantee of 
due process that exist in proper courts. In 2015, the FCA levied nearly £1 
billion of fines. The statutory financial regulators, of which the FCA is just 
one, control every aspect of financial market conduct. There is no 
5  For example, in FSA (2007) it is stated in the first sentence: ‘Principles-based 
regulation will sustain the current rigorous regulatory environment for UK financial 
services, but with better and more effective outcomes’. To be fair, the FSA was 





competition between regulators which is a serious problem as we shall 
see below.
The PRA, the other successor body of the FSA, has documents explaining 
its philosophy in relation to regulation. Some indication of the complexity 
created by the move from governing principles of law combined with private 
regulatory bodies is given by the fact that a single document explaining 
the PRA’s philosophy in relation to insurance regulation is ten times as 
long as the 1870 Insurance Companies Act which governed life insurance 
markets for 100 years. 
The growth of statutory regulation has been highlighted by Haldane (2012).6 
Haldane is not a supporter of deregulated financial markets in general.7 
However, he points out that the Basel rules for determining bank capital 
have grown from 30 to over 600 pages. He then notes, amongst a range 
of other data about the growth of regulatory detail: ‘In 1980, there was 
one UK regulator for roughly every 11,000 people employed in the UK 
financial sector. By 2011, there was one regulator for every 300 people 
employed in finance’. He did not point out that, if this trend growth in 
regulators and people employed in finance were to continue, the number 
of regulators would overtake the number of people employed in finance 
by about 2070 – and this excludes those who enforce regulation employed 
by regulated firms themselves (such as compliance officers).
This narrative and associated examples illustrate an important difference 
between statutory regulation and basic contract and supporting law. 
Contract law exists to ensure that those things agreed by the relevant 
parties are enforced. Such law widens the scope of economic transactions 
because participants in markets can have confidence in the agreements 
they make. This is not an intrinsically complicated function. Regulation, 
on the other hand, seeks to control participants in the market to achieve 
some kind of economic or social outcome. There is, in principle, no limit 
to the amount of regulation that this requires, nor to the detail that might 
be thought necessary, especially if the range of potential parties to the 
transaction is widened through international trade. The process of using 
regulation to achieve a particular economic or social outcome is akin to 
that by which a central planning authority might decide the quantities and 
types of various goods and services that should be produced.
6  Haldane (2012), The dog and the Frisbee, speech to Jackson Hole Economic Policy 
Symposium https://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf 
7 Though he did cite Hayek approvingly in the paper.
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Of course, there has always been some statutory financial regulation. 
However, the focus has changed. Regulation or legislation that prohibits 
certain activities can be brief and not very complex. For example, insider 
trading was prohibited in the 1980 Companies Act, with the required part 
of the Act taking fewer than nine pages.8 Today, insider dealing is regarded 
by the regulator as one of many forms of market abuse: the FCA market 
abuse regime is now defined in over 60 documents.9 To take another 
example, regulation that requires insurance companies to make public 
their assets and liabilities and the bases upon which they are calculated 
is not intrinsically complex. However, regulation that lays down approaches 
for the calculation of the capital that insurance companies should hold in 
order to have a 99.5 per cent chance of remaining solvent over a given 
period and which is sufficiently general to be applied to all companies is 
necessarily extremely complicated. 
Although regulation of financial markets by the state is a recent phenomenon 
in the UK, this does not mean that markets were unregulated historically. 
Economists and politicians often discuss whether there should be regulation, 
but rarely discuss who should regulate.
8  See Companies Act, 1980, pages 80-88. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/22/
pdfs/ukpga_19800022_en.pdf 




Historical examples of regulation 
arising from markets10
Regulatory institutions developed historically within financial markets to 
deal with known (though not always defined) problems. Institutions that 
were important in creating a stable and well-regulated order in financial 
markets included independent professions; intermediaries; trustee bodies; 
and firms with special corporate governance arrangements (such as 
customer-owned firms). In addition the use of ‘brands’ or ‘reputation’ helped 
counterparties and customers to distinguish between good and bad firms.11 
This was genuinely a process of entrepreneurial discovery as, within 
markets themselves, institutions evolved and there was competition to 
discover the best way to produce order and promote economic welfare 
within financial markets. 
However, institutions also developed that specifically exist to regulate 
market activity. Such institutions were not the creation of the state and 
nor was it compulsory that those participating in markets should be members 
of such institutions. They also developed as part of an entrepreneurial 
process that sees private governance and private rule-making as part and 
parcel of a set of services that have to be provided to bring order to markets. 
They arose, it can be assumed, because they raised the welfare of market 
participants in some way. Examples are discussed below.
10  It should be noted that non-state regulatory institutions are not unique to finance. 
They were pervasive in British society from the 1850s until World War II. For 
example, regulatory institutions developed in every branch of sport. The Royal and 
Ancient started to codify the rules of golf in 1897. The Football Association started to 
codify the rules of soccer in 1863, but then regulatory competition developed between 
the Rugby Football Union in 1871 and the Rugby League in 1895.
11  See Macey (2013).
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Exchanges
Historically, the most important regulatory institutions in financial markets 
have been exchanges. These are institutions on which securities and 
other financial interests or commodities are traded and which generally 
provide a comprehensive regulatory framework that promotes order. In 
the past, these institutions operated on a club-like basis. They developed 
rules to which their members had to adhere. Adherence to the rules came 
with a cost because the rules involved the prohibition of certain practices 
that may have been remunerative to individual members of the club. 
However, the rules also had a benefit because, if they were obeyed by all 
members of the club, they would enhance the reputation of the exchange 
as a whole. In other words, market confidence and trustworthiness can 
be thought of as a club good12 or service, the benefits from which are 
excludable but not reducible in consumption, and the price of obtaining 
that good comprises both membership fees and adherence to the rules. 
It is important that free riders cannot operate under the protection of the 
private regulatory body without obeying the rules: that is, it must be possible 
to exclude rule-breakers.
The development of exchanges is discussed in a number of texts describing 
the development of the City of London, as well as texts on private governance 
in general.13 In Britain, modern stock exchanges first developed in coffee shops, 
such as Jonathan’s coffee house in Change Alley. A group of 150 brokers and 
jobbers formed a club there in 1761 superseding more informal arrangements 
that had existed since 1698. This club developed into the first formally (though 
privately) regulated exchange in 1801 and, the following year, the exchange 
moved to Capel Court. The characteristics of the stock exchange included 
restrictions on membership, the publication of prices and lists of stocks that 
were traded, and the potential for the development of a rule book.
In the early years, the exchange was regulated by convention, reputation 
and informal rules. For example, when delayed settlement was introduced 
to increase liquidity, those who did not settle their accounts would be 
labelled ‘lame duck’ on a board so everybody would know. In many of the 
historical exchanges, such as Amsterdam, contracts were enforced that 
were not even recognised in law.
12  The analogy with Buchanan’s idea of a club good (see Buchanan, 1965) is not exact 
and would need more explanation than there is space to provide here. 
13  See, for example, Kynaston (2011); Stringham (2015); and Arthur and Booth (2010) 




Codification of rules happened in two ways. Firstly, there were rules 
governing the behaviour of members and the quotation of stock prices. 
Secondly, there were rules for companies listed on the exchange. The 
latter type of regulation developed rather later. These are precisely the 
forms of financial market regulation that it is commonly thought necessary 
for the state to provide and which the state now does provide. 
The first codified rule book covering topics such as default and settlement 
was developed by the London exchange in 1812. This rule book included 
provisions for settlement, arbitration and dealing with bad debts. There were 
also rules about general behaviour designed to increase transparency (for 
example, partnerships amongst members had to be listed publicly) and 
about the quotation of prices. One interesting example of the enforcement 
of rules was when the exchange absorbed collectively losses from an event 
of market manipulation and the inappropriate use of insider information in 
1814 whilst ensuring that those who attempted to profit did not gain.14 These 
are now matters that are entirely handled by government regulation. 
Rule books governing the behaviour of members were followed by rules 
for the quotation of companies’ securities. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
it became a requirement for securities to be sanctioned by the stock 
exchange committee before being listed on the exchange. At the turn of 
the 20th century, these rules became more onerous. Also, just after the turn 
of the 20th century, the exchange strengthened the requirement for the 
separation of jobbing and broking functions which became an important 
focus of attention at the time of Big Bang in 1986.15 There is no question 
that the exchange was an effective regulating and rule-making body. A 
Royal Commission enquiry in 1877-78 commented that the exchange’s 
rules were ‘capable of affording relief and exercising restraint far more 
prompt and often satisfactory than any within the read of the courts of law’.
In 1986, the stock exchange system of private rule-making was broken 
open. The separation of broking and dealing functions was ended as was 
the charging of fixed commissions. This was the process known as ‘Big 
Bang’. Big Bang is often thought of as a process of deregulation. However, 
it would be more accurately described as a process whereby certain types 
of private regulation were prohibited and replaced by regulatory bodies 
accountable ultimately to the state. The sweeping away of the various 
14  See: Davis, Neal, and White (2004).
15  See The Times, 1 February 1909, reproduced in Burns (1909).
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restrictive practices (limitations on entry to the market, fixed commissions 
and the separation of trading and broking) followed an agreement with 
the government that led to the suspension of a six-year-long enquiry by 
the Office of Fair Trading which had previously had its powers extended 
to include service industries.
It is not only securities markets that developed their own regulatory codes 
by which members had to abide. The Baltic Exchange provides another 
example. This was also established in a coffee house, in 1744. In 1823, 
to combat ‘wild gambling’, a committee was established to regulate 
admission and to develop trading rules. These rules evolved over time. 
The Baltic Code was developed in 1983 and revised in 2012. The motto 
of the exchange is ‘my word my bond’ and contracts were generally 
executed on trust without immediate exchange of signatures. The Baltic 
Code both requires and prohibits certain behaviours.16 Members who flout 
the code can be expelled or suspended and approaches to mediation and 
dispute resolution are set out within the code. 
Professional bodies
Another example of private regulatory institutions is the development of 
professional bodies.
Professional bodies tend to have a bad name amongst supporters of a 
free economy. They are often thought to promote restrictive practices and 
to seek monopolies. Such views have been reinforced by the work of 
authors such as Friedman.17 However, it is clear that Friedman regards 
the problem of professions as arising from restrictions on entry to the 
profession combined with a government preventing non-members of a 
professional body from practising unless they are members of the 
profession. Of course, such government intervention might well arise from 
lobbying by a well-organised professional body.
There is no reason in principle why a profession cannot control entry to 
ensure integrity and competence amongst a defined group of practitioners 
whilst non-professionals are also allowed to practice, albeit without the 
‘badge of approval’ from the profession. In other words where the state 
16   See: https://www.balticexchange.com/dyn/_assets/_pdfs/documentation/baltic_code_
nov14.pdf 




does not control entry, professions in financial services can be thought of 
as part of the ‘spontaneous product of the market, which has evolved to 
meet the special problems [of] the financial services industry’ (Booth 1997). 
Professional bodies in finance evolved in the UK, but in other cultures 
they did not. One good example of this is the actuarial profession. Though 
it is small, from the 1850s onwards, it has been pre-eminent in providing 
stewardship of insurance and pension funds as well as pricing products 
and determining distributions of profits between different categories of 
policyholders in insurance funds.
With regard to the actuarial profession in the UK, though actuaries in the 
19th century were split on the question of whether there should be a legal 
definition of an ‘actuary’ and whether there should be certain protected 
roles, there was no desire to protect the profession from competition. 
Indeed, until the 1980s, there was no significant state interference in or 
licensing of the profession at all. Contemporary reflections suggest that 
the absence of state regulation helped the profession to thrive and that 
such private systems of regulation were, in fact, more effective. For 
example, Nicoll (1898: 169-170) writes:
From what has preceded, it would seem as if there had not been 
much in the way of aid or protection accorded by the State to the 
actuarial profession in the performance of its duties. Our Free Trade 
Government has, however, been rightly - as it seems to us – very 
chary at all times of seeming to favour any particular society, or set 
of individuals, more especially if that favouring was at all likely to 
be at the expense of other members of the community. It is really 
very doubtful whether the policy of non-interference is not, in most 
circumstances, the best for a Government to pursue; and, as regards 
the Institute of Actuaries, it is very questionable if it would have been 
so vigorous, or so surely founded as it is at the present day if it had 
depended, at its inception, on assistance or support in any form 
from the State.
Comparisons are then made by Nicoll with the US market which was much 
more highly regulated by the state and in which such independent 
professions did not flourish, at least in this period.
Various theories of professions are discussed in Bellis (2000). They can 
be thought of as sociological constructs along the lines of fraternal societies 
with a common interest or, as noted above, as players in a political process 
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who try to seek monopoly rents by restricting access to a particular 
occupation. However, especially in financial services, they can be thought 
of as a group of people who have certain characteristics such as certified 
knowledge, a requirement to continually develop their knowledge and a 
requirement to uphold a professional code in markets that are often thought 
to be opaque or subject to information asymmetries. Professionals are 
also valued for their judgement in situations in which decisions cannot be 
made on the basis of objective evidence. And such judgement should be 
provided from an unbiased standpoint because professionals owe an 
allegiance to their profession and its codes of conduct as well as to clients 
or the company for which they are working. 
The use of professionals by companies selling financial services or by 
intermediaries of various types could then act as a simple signal to potential 
customers or other market participants in complex markets. By way of 
example, Bellis (2000: 323) notes that the AMP Society, a mutual life office 
in Australia established in 1848, set out rules that required the certification 
of the value of its liabilities and of distributions to different classes of 
members by an actuary or accountant: this was regarded as necessary 
to signal that the job was done properly. 
The accountancy profession is another example of a professional body 
which was important in financial markets. This is more sizeable than the 
actuarial profession. It also evolved in its modern form in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Its roles included certifying the books of public companies and 
of auditing. The key requirements were for independence, judgement and 
expertise. Allegiance to a professional body which had the power to control 
entry could help ensure these. The accountancy profession was important 
in both the UK and the US. In the US, the profession was not controlled 
by the state until the 1930s. Reporting and disclosure requirements for 
companies in the US came from the exchanges, not from the government. 
In fact, publicly quoted firms in the US did not have to be audited, though 
many were. By 1926, 90 per cent of companies quoted on the New York 
Stock Exchange had audited accounts and professional bodies of 
accountants with their own rules were responsible for auditing in many 
cases (see Zeff 2003). The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
had codes of conduct for its members18 as would be expected by a 
professional body. However, it was carrying out roles that were not licensed 
and not regulated by the state, but they were, nevertheless, regulated.
18  Indeed, A. C. Ernst resigned from the Institute because of the rule book and never 




In recent years, professions and their activities have been increasingly 
regulated by government bodies. This has gone hand-in-hand with a 
change in the nature of how professions operate, hugely increasing formal 
codification. The International Financial Reporting Standards dictating 
accounting requirements within the EU are now over 3,000 pages in length. 
Until 1990, accounting standards formed recommendations to members 
of the profession. The first such recommendation, SSAP 1, published in 
1971, was just eight pages long. 
Other evolved institutions designed to protect consumers and 
counterparties
There are many other examples of sophisticated market institutions that 
have evolved to deal with perceived ‘imperfections’ in markets. These 
include credit rating agencies19 and intermediaries involved in the sale of 
financial products. The respect for financial intermediaries has, of course, 
been undermined by the mis-selling scandals, though these have happened 
since statutory regulation of the sale of financial services products has 
been introduced. The most serious of these mis-selling scandals, insofar 
as it involved financial intermediaries, was possibly the pensions mis-
selling crisis of the mid-to-late 1980s. This was the direct result of the UK 
government prohibiting by law, and changing retrospectively, paternalistic 
arrangements developed by employers which required their employees 
to join company pension schemes. Such paternalistic arrangements were 
themselves market regulatory mechanisms which the government 
undermined through statutory regulation. The result was the mis-selling 
crisis which provided an apparent justification for more government 
regulation of sales processes for financial products.20
19  Credit rating agencies acquired a bad reputation in the financial crisis. However, for a 
full discussion of how regulators distorted their behaviour, see Morrison (2009).
20  It is worth explaining the genesis of the crisis in greater detail. The 1986 Social 
Security Act prevented employees and employers agreeing contracts of employment 
which required membership of a company pension scheme as a condition of 
employment. Most of these schemes were especially good value for members. 
Pension company salesforces tried to entice such people to leave their company 
schemes and take out a personal pension scheme (which were generally much 
less good value and higher risk). Such pensions policies were regarded as being 
‘mis-sold’ – or not appropriate for the client. The Act actually involved retrospection 
so that previously agreed contracts of employment which required pension scheme 
membership were over-ridden by law.
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The insurance market developed mechanisms to regulate product sales 
through the intermediary market directly. One such market institution was 
a maximum commission agreement amongst life insurance companies. 
This was an agreement between life insurance companies that limited the 
amount of commission that could be charged by intermediaries (such as 
insurance brokers) when selling the companies’ products. This helped to 
ensure that intermediaries made recommendations based on the soundness 
of the life insurance company the policies of which they were recommending, 
or on the basis of other characteristics valued by the purchaser, rather 
than on the basis of the amount of commission they would receive. This 
agreement was abolished by the competition authorities under pressure 
from the EU.21 Since then there have been numerous mis-selling scandals 
related to the sale of insurance products motivated by the amount of 
commission brokers received rather than by the needs of the customer.
We should not be surprised at the proliferation of institutions in markets 
designed to regulate behaviour. Market regulatory mechanisms can lead 
to a race to the top, rather than the feared race to the bottom and the 
elimination of the high-quality segments of the market that is predicted by 
the literature on information asymmetries (for example, Akerlof 1970). In 
the market for second-hand cars, warranties have developed to help 
protect consumers from bad cars and to allow car salesmen to signal that 
they are selling good cars. In different ways, financial institutions can 
develop mechanisms that reduce the potential for conflicts of interest or 
other problems that can be inherent within financial markets and will be 
rewarded for doing so. Lightfoot points out that the historical evidence 
suggests that, before the regulation of financial markets in the US by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, banks had higher capital-to-asset 
ratios than afterwards (see Lightfoot 2003; Capie and Wood 2013). In 
addition, in the 1920s, so-called universal banks, which conducted both 
investment banking and commercial banking, were effectively penalised 
by those entering into contracts with them. This meant that securities 
underwritten by such banks had to offer higher yields, reflecting the 
possibility of greater conflicts of interest than would exist where there were 
separately capitalised investment banks with their own balance sheets 
and separate boards of directors. In both banking and insurance markets 
mutual companies developed which reduced conflicts of interest between 
owners and customers. In banking, the trustees savings banks offered 





100 per cent reserve accounts in the era before deposit insurance and 
bank capital regulation.
These were not regulatory institutions as such. However, they are 
mechanisms that signal to those who interact with financial institutions 
and that allow counterparties to make a judgement about the incentives 
that exist within those institutions for the kind of practices that might 
damage consumers and be difficult for them to perceive. These signalling 
and governance mechanisms have now been replaced by government 
regulation of behaviour.
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Modern alternatives to 
government regulation
As has been discussed, the club-like institutions described above are no 
longer the main regulators of activity in financial markets. As far as the 
main market of the London Stock Exchange is concerned, it is true that 
there are still special requirements in relation to listing and trading 
determined by the exchange. However, listing, trading and disclosure rules 
are so bound up with government regulation and EU directives that the 
regulatory role of the exchange is now residual.
Nevertheless, there are examples of private regulators that are still important 
in their own domain. For example, there are some exemptions from EU 
regulations relating to the trading and listing of securities. The Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) has developed to take advantage of those 
exceptions. Shares are traded on that market, subject to the regulations 
set by AIM. Statutory regulation still applies in cases of market abuse but, 
otherwise, the market develops its rulebook independently of government. 
AIM requires that companies must produce half-yearly reports and annual 
audited accounts. Where a company is located outside a jurisdiction that 
applies specific accounting standards, AIM still requires accounts to be 
produced according to recognised standards, but allows some discretion. 
There are also AIM regulations in relation to dealing in shares by directors 
and similar categories of employees, together with other rules dealing 
with disclosure, conduct and trading.22 The total market capitalisation of 
all the companies that trade on AIM is over £100 billion. There are 14 





companies the shares of which are traded on the exchange which have 
a market capitalisation of over £1 billion.
Derivatives exchanges also develop their own regulatory environment. 
Even off-exchange dealing is regulated by a private regulatory body, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). ISDA’s mission 
is: ‘[to foster] safe and efficient derivatives markets to facilitate effective 
risk management for all users of derivative products’. It achieves this by 
‘Developing standardized documentation globally to promote legal certainty 
and maximum risk reduction’.23 Members have to apply to join ISDA and 
can have their membership revoked. 
Members can choose to use the ISDA master agreement. This was used 
for 90 per cent of outstanding derivatives contracts at the end of 2016 of 
almost $0.5 quadrillion.24 In addition, as part of its regulatory function, 
ISDA also has a dispute resolution procedure (thus circumventing the 
need to use government courts in most instances) and a Credit Derivatives 
Determinations Committee. The latter uses a set of rules to determine 
whether a credit default event has taken place and thus whether 
counterparties to a derivative contract need to settle.
Of course, private regulators exist in many areas of the economy outside 
finance. The example of sport has already been mentioned. Private regulators 
are becoming increasingly common in markets where new technology leads 
to the provision of services in new ways that transcend those existing modes 
of provision that are regulated by the state. Perhaps the most topical private 
regulator is Uber. Uber is a platform. It regulates the drivers that use the 
platform and also has methods of regulating the behaviour of its customers. 
It is a dominant market player as a regulator in its own specific domain. 
However, it competes with government-regulated taxis, such as the black 
cabs regulated by Transport for London (TfL). Uber facilitates competition 
between drivers and breaks down information asymmetries within the market 
for private hire vehicles by promoting more effective regulation by reputation 
via the mutual rating of customers and drivers. 
There are differences in approach between Uber and black cabs regulated 
by TfL. Uber uses a pricing system that ensures continuity of supply, but 
not a fixed price. On the other hand, various requirements are imposed 
23  See: http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/mission-statement/ 
24   See Bank for International Settlements statistics at: http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_
hy1705.htm 
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on licensed black cabs (flat fares, knowledge requirements to obtain a 
licence) which benefit different types of customer. Customers can choose 
between the regulatory framework offered by black cabs and that offered 
by Uber or other platform operators. There is competition between regulatory 





Government regulation as the 
supposed solution to market 
failure
The general presumption is that state regulation is necessary to deal with 
what economists often describe as ‘market failure’. This conclusion is 
often derived from the neo-classical approach to economic reasoning in 
which it is thought that particular conditions have to hold to maximise 
welfare.25 Given that these conditions never can hold, it is generally 
assumed that an unregulated market fails to maximise welfare and that 
intervention by governments is necessary and desirable. As such, it is 
proposed that governments and government regulatory bureaus levy taxes 
or apply regulations to attempt to move the market towards its welfare 
maximising position.
This is the rationale for regulation that has been put forward by government 
financial regulators. For example, in one publication by the UK financial 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), in 2003, it was stated 
(FSA 2003):
In meeting our objectives in a manner consistent with the principles 
of good regulation, we have adopted a regulatory approach based 
on correcting market failure…There are, however, numerous cases 
where unregulated financial markets will not achieve the best 
outcome due to some form of market failure, making action on our 
part necessary.
25  For example, perfect information, the absence of externalities and so on.
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Perhaps, the most interesting part of this statement is the last clause. The 
FSA notes that they deem action on ‘our’ part ‘necessary’. In other words, 
state regulation is a necessary remedy for market failure. The possibility 
of other regulatory bodies arising or intervention by the state regulator 
actually making things worse is not considered.
This is essentially a blackboard economics view of financial regulation, 
as the late Ronald Coase would have called it: the reasons for and proposed 
forms of intervention are derived using abstract theory.
In more recent years, the publicly stated justifications for the statutory 
regulation of financial services have become more subtle. The FCA, one 
of the successor bodies to the FSA, now explains its purposes in a 61-
page document. This documents notes: ‘In assessing whether intervention 
is needed, we consider a range of market failures including…’ (FCA 2015). 
It then goes on to say that one such market failure is ‘existing regulation, 
which might have adverse effects on competition’ (ibid.).26 It is slightly 
bizarre that it should regard regulatory barriers to entry as a market failure. 
Nevertheless, it appears that ‘market failures’ are just one of a range of 
considerations that determine regulatory interventions.
The image of the ‘market failure’ model is one of the government regulator 
as a puller of levers designed to move the market towards its welfare-
maximising position. There are two problems with this analysis. The first 
is that we have much prior theory and evidence to suggest that government 
regulators cannot perfect an imperfect market and may not even improve 
upon its outcome. Secondly, it fails to consider the development of regulation 
within the market itself as is discussed above. 
Problems of government regulation
The obvious critiques of government regulation would originate from the 
Austrian and public choice literatures. Firstly, in the same way that a central 
planner cannot know in advance how to produce and what to produce in 
order to maximise consumer welfare, we cannot know in advance what is 
the welfare maximising form of regulation. Will regulation be too burdensome 
and costly? Or will it not protect the consumer sufficiently or in the right 
way? Will the costs in terms of reduced competition and innovation outweigh 





communicating the balance of costs and benefits of different forms of 
regulation and incentivising the regulatory bureau to provide the right amount 
of regulation in the right way. Indeed, some of the costs are unknowable.
In principle at least, private regulators can compete and can benefit from 
providing better regulation than their competitors. A stock exchange would 
be able to charge higher fees to companies for listing their shares if the 
regulatory environment they provided led to a lower cost of capital for the 
company. For example, a taxi regulation platform which led to drivers 
being expelled from the system if they received one rating below the 
maximum number of stars would hugely raise the cost to consumers as 
drivers would be reluctant to use the platform without significant 
corresponding benefit. On the other hand, one which did not distinguish 
at all between consumer perceptions of the quality of drivers would be of 
no benefit to consumers and the platform would not be used. When there 
is a market for regulatory services, there are built-in incentives to optimise. 
A government regulatory body is not able to accumulate such information 
on its efficacy and it cannot be assumed that it will improve upon the 
market outcome. As noted by Hayek (1979: 70), ‘If the factual requirements 
for “perfect” competition are absent, it is not possible to make firms behave 
“as if” it existed’. If, for example, there were no information asymmetries 
in a market, the market outcome would be different from the one which 
arises when there are information asymmetries, but we do not know how 
different or in what respect it would be different. And we cannot simply 
require the provision of information to consumers and assume that the 
market failure is solved. The information is costly to provide, it needs 
interpretation and a regulator cannot know what information is relevant to 
a consumer’s decisions. The regulation itself might add to the difficulties 
faced by both consumers and firms when acting within markets and bring 
with it other problems. Indeed, it may add to the complexity of the whole 
process of buying a financial product thus worsening the problem.27 
27   The author examined the information provided with a unit trust product, the provision 
of much of which is encouraged by the regulator. During the purchase process 
of a very simple product, the customer was advised to read no fewer than nine 
documents. One of these was over 1,000 pages long and another about 500 pages 
long. These two documents had little information that was relevant to the particular 
fund. No attempt was made to be discriminating. Of course, this is not all required by 
regulation, but a risk averse provider, in the face of regulation designed to promote 
information provision will tend to provide more rather than less. In another example, 
it has been reported that the regulations implemented by the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority in respect of the EU Market in Financial Instruments Directive (II) run to 
1,700,000 paragraphs. These regulations are designed to promote transparency. 
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Further problems of government regulation relate to its capture by those 
whose interests it is not supposed to serve. Regulation is intended to 
serve market participants and perhaps the general public. However, a 
statutory regulatory body is disciplined by a government formed as a result 
of quinquennial elections that are fought on a range of issues and which 
can be very remote from the management of individual regulatory bureaus. 
In other words, there is a huge principal-agent problem between the agent 
(the regulatory bureau) and the principal (the market participants and/or 
general public). Furthermore, regulation can be captured by firms which 
wish to raise the costs to rivals or it can be designed to fulfil the objectives 
of regulators or politicians.28
Unfortunately, whilst economic theory can tell us when a market will not 
give a theoretically perfect outcome, it cannot generally tell us whether 
the intervention of a state regulator will produce a better one. The market 
failure approach is simply an intellectual dead end or rabbit hole. The 
reasoning in the market failure model runs as follows: ‘a given set of 
assumptions is necessary to maximise welfare; these assumptions do not 
hold; therefore we should pull regulatory levers to improve welfare’. But, 
once we accept that the government regulator will not be able to maximise 
welfare either, there is nowhere left for this line of reasoning to go. 
Critiques of private regulation
To argue that we cannot know if government regulation will improve upon 
market outcomes is not to say that there are no problems with private 
regulation. Indeed, there are a number of potential problems. The first is 
that it might not deal effectively with external social costs – that is, those 
costs not borne by the market participants or which are external to the 
system of parties who subscribe to the regulatory body. For example, if 
the costs of the failure of a bank have very wide ramifications, it could be 
argued that government regulation should be considered.29 
It could also be argued that private forms of regulation give rise to 
concentrations of power. Interestingly, there is a discussion around the 
edges of this issue without it being related to the question of the institutional 
28  See the literature on public choice economics. 
29   Though, it may be preferable to ensure that we have bankruptcy procedures that are 
designed to reduce the spillover effects of failure in this particular example, but other 
examples could be given such as the regulation of carbon emissions that may have 




advantages and disadvantages of private versus government regulation 
in Akerlof (1970). In Akerlof’s paper, in which he introduced the possibility 
of ‘market failures’ caused by information asymmetries, it was noted that 
private institutions might address the problem. But it was also noted that 
such institutions would not be atomistic. This is because they have to 
govern standards across the whole market or a substantial sub-section 
of the market. Private regulatory institutions are therefore bound to be few 
in number in a given market. Interestingly, as has been noted above, it 
was competition concerns that led both to the curbing of the regulatory 
powers of stock exchanges and to the abolition of the maximum commission 
agreement amongst insurance companies. 
Whilst this is true, government regulators are monopolistic by design. 
Furthermore, private regulatory systems will generally have competitive 
elements. They may also be contestable or, in an international context, 
there may be effective competition. Uber, for example, competes against 
other forms of regulatory mechanism in the provision of taxi services and 
also has the threat of entry from other similar platforms. Indeed, it is 
Transport for London (TfL) that has used its monopoly power as a statutory 
body to try to constrain regulatory competition between Uber and more 
tightly regulated black cabs. In the case of securities’ markets, it is highly 
likely that the development of technology, combined with the removal of 
exchange controls seven years before ‘Big Bang’, would have led to 
international competition curbing the restrictive practices of the stock 
exchange. Indeed, exchanges do compete on an international basis.30 
Off-exchange dealing was also possible before Big Bang, whereas after 
the enactment of the Financial Services Act all those participating in 
securities markets were regulated by the monopoly regulator
A third problem with private regulation is that there might be problems 
such as information asymmetries that are so radical that their existence 
is not understood and so the value of market institutions to resolve them 
is not recognised by market participants. As a result, private regulatory 
institutions may not develop. Related to this may be the difficulty consumers 
have in determining the efficacy of private regulators.31 
30  Also, there were a number of different exchanges in the UK up to 1973. Furthermore, 
there was competition between different ways of providing capital to companies. 
31  Of course, with private regulators, despite the argument above relating to market 
power, there can be comparison, discussion and scrutiny.
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The final possible problem is that private regulatory institutions might lack 
powers of enforcement. Such limitations will generally arise from government 
law. For example, government law might prevent a profession or other 
organisation from expelling people on the ground that to do so would be 
regarded as a restraint of trade.32 Or there may be limits on the fines that 
can be levied on those who submit themselves to private regulation. Clearly, 
a private regulatory body could not imprison a market participant who broke 
the rules under most penal codes! The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
by contrast has almost unlimited powers to invoke civil and criminal penalties. 
This problem is not, of course, a market failure, but there may not be an 
obvious way to resolveit in most legal jurisdictions.
32  A particularly good example of this problem is the case between the Test and County 
Cricket Board (TCCB) and the players who joined Kerry Packer’s World Series 
Cricket (WSC) in 1977. The TCCB, as the regulator of the game, banned players 
from county and test cricket who joined WSC. The court accepted that the regulation 
of cricket was good thing, but that the action of the TCCB amounted to a restraint of 
trade and therefore was not valid. This was the case even though WSC provided an 




A realistic approach to the 
economics of regulation
If market failure analysis leads to a dead end, it is clearly not the right 
starting point for analysis. 
The starting point should be a rejection of the idea that the market develops 
separately from regulatory institutions and that the latter need to be created 
to correct so-called failures in the former. Instead, we should regard the 
regulations that dictate how various parties to transactions operate as part 
of the set of services that can be provided by the market and which are 
produced by the entrepreneurial process. They can be provided directly 
by market participants and also by independent institutions, such as 
exchanges or professions. If regulation is understood as part of the package 
of services which govern the operation of the market then the process of 
competition is necessary to discover the best form of regulation. It is not 
in doubt that the market can provide regulatory services. The open questions 
relate to the market’s efficacy in doing so. Regulation is not something 
that has to be ‘done’ to a market from outside. 
Instead of market failure analysis, the right framework for the economic 
analysis of regulation should involve three steps. 
Firstly, a comparative institutions analysis will help us understand whether 
market institutions or government institutions are likely to be most effective 
at maximising welfare in particular circumstances. Or, at least it can help 
us define the relative advantages and disadvantages of private and 
government regulation in a particular context. In the market failure model, 
government regulation is always theoretically desirable because the market 
will never settle on a theoretical welfare-maximising position. Secondly, 
we can determine the legal environment most conducive to the evolution 
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of regulatory institutions within the market. Thirdly, if government regulatory 
institutions are preferred, we can consider the policy environment in which 
they might best complement, rather than replace, evolved market institutions. 
In other words, we should consider the relative merits of alternative 
institutional approaches to the provision of regulation. This approach is 
not widely discussed in the literature.33
In terms of practical policy, the most obvious approach in financial markets 
is to make government regulation optional, but require market participants 
to make very clear whether their products are regulated by the state. That 
would at least ensure that the possibility of private regulation was not 
closed off. If private regulatory institutions developed, the public could 
choose whether they wanted to obtain services from institutions also 
regulated by the state. 
This approach of ‘regulatory competition’ between state and private 
regulators does work. As has been noted above, AIM provides a regulatory 
environment for the trading of shares in companies, many of which are 
not affected by EU directives on listing and trading. Secondly, in a different 
area, in London consumers can choose between cab services provided 
by Uber, with its own approach to regulating quality, and black cabs with 
a different approach to the regulation of both quality and price. TfL should 
encourage this approach and it should not be able to establish a regulatory 
monopoly (see below).  
Furthermore, the state should be very careful before restricting the activities 
of private regulators on competition grounds. At the very least, when 
considering such issues, the market should be defined widely and the 
case that a regulatory platform might be contestable should be considered. 
Uber, for example, may have a virtual monopoly in its very specific product 
field in some countries, but it competes with taxis, private hire cars, buses, 
tubes and private cars.
The market failure model in which we think about regulation should be 
jettisoned. The conditions for perfect competition and welfare maximisation 
will never be met in a market. It can never be known in advance whether 
statutory regulation will help. Of course, decisions have to be made about 
regulation, but, if those decisions are made by statutory regulatory bodies 
33   There are analogies here with the work of Elinor Ostrom who won the Nobel Prize in 
2009 who did ask some of these questions in relation to the institutional framework 




themselves, they will be subject to behavioural biases and biases that 
arise from public choice interests. We should therefore avoid the creation 
of regulatory bodies that have no effective constraints and that can write 
rules widely and more or less without limit or any form of accountability. 
Where statutory regulators are set up, they should operate under strict 
constraints. Having different statutory regulators for different parts of the 
market, as used to be the case in financial markets before 2000, is also 
an advantage as it allows comparisons and allows products that perform 
different functions to be regulated according to different principles. This 
allows some trial, error and learning between different regulatory 
approaches. 
One further reform which might help re-establish regulatory pluralism 
would be to allow the Competition and Markets Authority to investigate 
both whether regulatory services provided by the state are monopolistic 
and whether state regulators inhibit competition. TfL, for example, should 
not be able to establish a regulatory monopoly by prohibiting Uber. 
Regulatory services are too important to be provided by statutory monopolies 
with inbuilt behavioural and institutional biases to expand their role.
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